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I.

Introduction

Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or "the Act") in 1978 for the express
purpose of "protect[ing] the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families."' Indian tribes were given "exclusive jurisdiction as to any
State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled
within the reservation of such tribe."' States, though normally recognized as having jurisdiction
over adoption procedures within their boundaries, were faulted with ''often fail[ing] to recognize
the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in
Indian communities and families."' As a departure from prior assimilationist policies, and an
affirmation of tribal sovereignty and self-determination, ICWA expressly recognized the
importance of cultural ancestry and tradition to Indian children. Congress recognized the vested
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interest that Indian tribes have in their children as essential to their collective existence and
created the Act to protect this relationship.
Some of the key provisions of the ICWA are the definitions of "Indian child" and "child
custody proceeding" in section 1903. An Indian child is defined as "any unmanied person who
is under the age of eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.4 Child
custody proceeding, according to the Act "means and includes (i) foster care placements.. . (ii)
termination of parental rights.. . (iii) termination of parental rights.. . (iii) preadoptive

' 25 U.S.C.$1902(1978)
,p
.
.

" d at $1911

Id. at §1901(5)
'Id at §1903(4)

P

placement.. . and (iv) adoptive placement."s The clear language used in these definitions makes
it easy to determine to whom and when the Act should apply.
The specific mandate of the Act subject to just two exceptions gives exclusive jurisdiction to
the tribes over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within his or her tribe's reservation or is a ward of a tribal COUI-t.6The only exceptions
to this grant of exclusive jurisdiction are in the event that the child custody proceeding involves
placement resulting from a divorce or a criminal act.' If the child is not domiciled or residing
within its tribe's reservation the Act orders that the state court "shall transfer such proceeding to
the jurisdiction of the tribe."8 This transfer is subject to objection by either parent, declination by
the tribal court or a finding of good cause to the contrary."
Congress developed the Act over several years during which a considerable amount of
testimony was heard. This testimony included statistical data as well as pleas for help from the
tribes. The data showed an unusually high percentage of adoptions and placements of Indian
children, mostly into non-Indian homes. Many of these placements were made without input
from the tribes. If Indian children continued to be removed at the present rate the future of many
tribes would have been seriously jeopardized. Legislators recognized this threat to Indian
families and to the future of Indian tribes and responded with the ICWA. Nevertheless many
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Id. at $1903(l)(i)"foster care placement" which shall mean any action removing an Indian child from its parent or
Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator
where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not
been terminated; (ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action resulting in the termination of the
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states have attempted to circumvent the application of the Act continuing to remove Indian
children from their homes. This removal continues to threaten the survival of tribes themselves.
Even though it was intended to establish a uniform set of guidelines for the states to use for
the adoption and placement of Indian children the ICWA has received different reactions from
many states. These reactions are often based on local policies and feelings about Indian tribal
authority. Thirty-five states have accepted the provisions of the Act and have incorporated them
into their state adoption or dependency codes.I0 The state of Oklahoma passed its own ICWA
for the express purpose of clarif9ng state policies and procedures for the implementation of the
federal act and to "cooperate fully with Indian tribes in Oklahoma in order to ensure that the
intent and provisions of the federal ICWA are enforced."" Other states have attacked the Act's
provisions both judicially and legislatively making the provisions more convenient and less
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intrusive on their state sovereignty.
One particular state judicial modification of ICWA, the Existing Indian Family exception

(EIF) originated in the Kansas courts'2 and was then adopted by a number of states. This
modification excepts the application of the ICWA provisions if the Indian child in question has
not lived in a family that is then determined by the court to be sufficiently connected to a tribe.
The Kansas Supreme Court, while admitting that the language in ICWA" mandated its
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$109.309 (OR); S.C. Code Ann. $27-16-80; S.D.Codified Laws $26-7A-2; Tem.CodeAm. $36-1-1 11;
Tex.Fam.Code $152.104; Utah Code AM. $62A-2-117; 15A V.S.A. $1-107 (VT); Wash. Rev. Code. Ann.
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application, refused to apply its provisions. The case involved the adoption of an illegitimate
Indian child born to a non-Indian mother who sought to place her son with a non-Indian couple
over the objections of the non-custodial Indian father who was incarcerated at the time. Without
explicitly overturning ICWA, the courts using the EIF weaken the Act's authority and provide a
continued means of attack from its critics. When the U.S. Supreme Court reached its decision in

Holyfield the constitutionality of ICWA was not an issue and the existing Indian family
exception was neither addressed nor applied. Some jurisdictions saw the lack of any discussion
of the EIF as a validation of its continued existence, while others were satisfied that the
exception would have been raised if it were valid. The ICWA legislative history and many court
opinions question the merits of this judicially created exception that nevertheless continues to be
supported.
e.

Only one case questioning the ICWA authority has reached the Supreme Court. Mississippi

Band of Choctaw Indians v. ~ o l ~ f i e l involved
d'~
a dispute that revolved around the definition of
the term "domiciled" as applied to an Indian child who was born outside the tribal reservation.
The holding stressed the need to "protect the interests of the Indian community in retaining its
children within its society."'5 It also reaffirmed the Act's intent to establish some uniformity
with regards to the state courts' handling of adoption and placement of Indian children.
Twenty-three years after the enactment of ICWA the percentage of Indian children being
placed into non-Indian homes is still high. Specific data is hard to collect because of the nature
of child custody proceedings. States are not required to report adoption statistics and case files
are often kept closed. Nevertheless, the ICWA process, if followed, can help ensure that
placement has been done with the consent of the tribes and can thus "eventually ensure the
fl
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survival of Indian tribes and cu~tures."'~ICWA has created the possibility for some of these
adoptions to be "open adoptions" that enable the Indian child to retain contact with their birth
parents and/or tribe and thus remain connected to their cultural roots.
Legislation to amend the Act has been proposed by those who oppose it as well as by some
who support it. An amendment proposed in 1996 by Senator John McCain would hold those
who try to circumvent the Act by fraudulently placing children for adoption criminally liable.''
Additional legislation has been proposed that would amend the ICWA, to codify the Existing
Indian Family exception and also to restrict the rights of tribes to intervene in proceedings.'8 To
date, none of these amendments have been approved and ICWA remains unchanged, an
indication that the Act, after twenty years is still considered a valid response to the continuing
removal of Indian children from their tribes and families.
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In part I1 of this paper the social, legislative, and judicial histories that lead to the situation

that the ICWA was designed to correct will be discussed. There was substantial testimony
before Congress during the creation of the act and it provides evidence as to the attitude and
motives of those involved with the creation of this legislation. The testimony paints a vivid
picture of the situation that demanded some sort of action on the part of Congress. The resulting
Act is an express affirmation that the United States policy of assimilation and removal of Indian
children from the tribes has been replaced with an acknowledgement of a tribe's sovereign
interest in controlling the placement of its most precious resource, its children. The intent of the
Act is clear and its language understandable when read in this light. Part 111 will examine the
reaction of the states to the requirements imposed by ICWA. The way that the states have

B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Weljirre A d Handbook (ABA Family Law Section, 1995)
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incorporated ICWA into their adoption policies and/or passed regulations that affected its
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provisions is indicative of the respect (or lack thereof) by the states for the tribal right of selfdetermination and self-preservation. Adoption advocates claiming to work for the best interests
of Indian children often argue in favor of the Existing Indian Family exception and have gained
support from certain members of Congress. Their perspective is often based on racial
stereotypes about Indian life that perpetuate the belief that Indian children would be better off
raised in non-Indian environments. What can and/or should the tribes do to see that their
interpretation of what is in the best interest of Indian children is recognized? Part rV will briefly
attempt to answer this question looking to some alternatives that have been successful and others
that have not, and others that have not yet been tried.
The future of the Indian nations continues to be threatened by the removal of their children.
n

The ICWA was an acknowledgement of this situation and an attempt to rectify the problem by
ensuring that Indian tribes have a voice in decisions involving their own Indian children. The
Act's success or failure is contingent upon an acknowledgement of the tribes' sovereign rights
and interests and a respect for their decisions as to what they feel is in the best interests of their
children. As long as state courts and special interest groups continue to ignore the clear language
of the Act by relying on judicially created exceptions the purpose of ICWA will not be fulfilled.

IS.

PRE-ICWA HISTORY AND THE REACTIONS THAT FOLLOWED

A. Tribal Sovereignty and Early Indian Policy

Since the time of the first contact with the original occupants of this country intercourse with
,-.

the tribes has been rooted in a sovereign-to-sovereign basis. Though this relationship has
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changed and has been redefined over the last four or five centuries the principle that the Indian
tribes are to be recognized as independent governments has survived. During the founding years
of the United States the "formal dealings with Indian tribes.. . were conducted almost exclusively
by treaty-making.. . this method of dealing itself implied recognition of tribes as self-governing
peoples."'9 Article 11, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives the President the power to make
treaties, which under the Supremacy clauseZ0are "superior to any conflicting state laws or
constitutional provisions."2' The fact that the founders chose to use treaties to codify their
negotiations with the Indian tribes is significant in that it reflects the belief that the tribes were
sovereign governments.
Federal Indian policy has evolved over the years by means of treaties, legislation and judicial
decisions. Many policy decisions, from those respecting tribal authority to those attacking their
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continued existence still acknowledge the unique status of the Indian tribes vis-8-vis the United
States government. While the purposes behind the policies have changed over time the
legislation and judicial decisions continue to recognize of the inherent sovereignty of Indian
tribes.
According to Francis Paul Prucha, "the general rule is that a treaty is a formal agreement
between two or more fully sovereign and recognized states operating in an international
forum."22 The history of treaty making between the United States and Indian tribes departs from
this general rule as a result of the nature of the "forum" involved and the motivation that drove
the continued use of the process. While the initial agreements signed with the Indian tribes
seemed to fit within the general rule it was not long before the status of the Indian tribes and
DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 73 (4" ed. 1998)
U.S. Comt. Alt. VI, c1. 2
" FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982)
22 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, 2 (1994)
l9
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their ownership of land began to change. This change and the almost continual negotiation with
the tribes were motivated by a growing desire for land. The status of the title held by the Indians
was formally changed when the Supreme Court announced its decision in Johnson v. ~ c l n f o s h . ~ '

Justice Marshall declared that the Indians were the rightful occupants of the soil but the power to
convey the lands was limited by the idea that discovery [by the European explorers] had vested
fee title in the government.24 From this point on U.S. Indian policy became even more focused
on Westward expansion and ways to encourage the continued cession of Indian lands. The
method of choice by which the lands were acquired was by treaty. While these treaties often
included provisions for ceding more land they also served to build and support the sovereignty of
the tribes with whom the U.S. continued to negotiate.
While the federal government did not necessarily concern itself about the developing
P

political status of the tribes it was noticed by many of the states. The states were interested in
expanding their boarders and often came up against the boundaries of Indian territories that had
been established by treaties. In the early part of the 1800's gold was discovered on land that
belonged to the Cherokee Nation near the state of Georgia. The people of Georgia refused to
respect the Cherokee Nation and its laws and entered the land at will. Georgia even expanded its
criminal authority into what had been designated by treaty as Cherokee country. President
Andrew Jackson, an advocate for Indian removal refused requests from the Cherokee Nation to
enforce its treaty provisions through federal intervention. The President's support of Georgia's
activities encouraged them to continue their encroachment. The Supreme Court was ultimately
responsible for the resolution of the dispute.
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Mcintosh, 21 U.S. ( 8 Wheat) 543,5 L.Ed. 681 (1823)

Chief John Ross of the Cherokee Nation sought to enjoin the execution of Georgia's laws in
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the Cherokee Nation. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia was an original action filed in the Supreme
Court under its Constitutional authority to hear controversies between foreign states.25 The
theory of the case was that the execution of Georgia's laws was a violation of federal law and the
Cherokee Nation's treaty rights. The Supreme Court refised to hear the merits of the case
finding that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation as intended in the Article I11 grant of
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the means by which the Court came to their conclusion carried a
greater impact than any decision on the merits ever could have: The Cherokee Nation was
declared a "domestic, dependent nation" yet they were "recognized [by the United States] as a
people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war.. .[and] responsible.. . for any
aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their
c

community."26
One year after Cherokee Nation, the application of a Georgia state criminal statute on land
"
Worcester
belonging to the Cherokee Nation was questioned in Worcester v. ~ e o r ~ i a . Samuel

was a missionary charged with violating a Georgia criminal statute applied to Cherokee land.
The statute required whites living in a part of the Cherokee Nation to swear an oath of allegiance
to the state of Georgia and to possess a state license. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia
law was contrary to the U.S. Constitution, federal laws and the treaty with the Cherokee Nation.
The Cherokee Nation was described as "a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter."28
Numerous officials from Georgia, including the governor refused to obey the Court's decision.
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,8 L. Ed. 25 (1831)
Id. at 16
" Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.(6 Pet.) 515.8 L. Ed. 483 (1832)
26
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President Jackson in response to the holding allegedly said, "John Marshall has made his law;
now let him enforce it." Regardless of whether the statement was actually made or not President
Jackson did nothing to enforce the Court's holding, preferring to continue his support for the idea
that the Indian tribes should be "removed" to lands west of the Mississippi. For the Indian tribes
the choice to be made was between remaining in their homelands to face the risk of being
overrun by white opportunists or giving up their land and moving to an unknown area where it
was promised that they could live in peace.

B. The Policy of Removal and Indoctrination
As England and Spain began their expansion into the "New World" their initial plan for
conquest included replacing the traditional beliefs and way of life of the Indians and removing
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the Indian children from their culture and family. One of the principal aims of the explorers was
"to bring the natives not only to the true Knowledge and Worship of God but to human Civility,
and to a settled and quiet govemment."2%eligious conversion was directed at the adult
population in hopes that they might be convinced to choose a more "civilized" way of life.
Another plan was presented at the first representative assembly meeting in Jamestown wherein
"eache towne, citty, Borrough, and particular plantation do obtaine unto themselves by just
means a certaine number of the natives' children to be educated by them in the true religion and
civile courses of life. .. As to how these children would be acquired, the suggestion was made in
official documents.. . that they should be kidnapped."30 Whether this plan was actually carried
out or not is unclear. Nevertheless the tenor of its stated objective survives and has been restated
through various enactments of federal Indian policy.
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ANGIE DEBO,A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES, 40 (1970)
id,at 41

The removal of Indian children from their homes served two purposes in the minds of those
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who hoped for the assimilation of the Indian tribes. The first purpose would be to break the
continuity of tribal customary existence. The void created by the absence of the Indian children
would restrict the ability of the tribes to pass their culture and traditions on to future generations.
Secondly, once the Indian children had been sufficiently reprogrammed they could be returned to
their communities to erode the traditional cultural stability from within. Many different policies
were enacted in furtherance of these goals.
Towards the latter part of the 1800's reformists fought for the creation of off-reservation
boarding schools thinking them an ideal method of assimilation. Officially the federal boarding
school system was founded in 1879 even though funding had been previously provided for the
mission schools. It was believed that the key to the success of these schools was that "the Indian

,-- youths were [to be] completely removed from the family and from the barbarism of tribal life."3'
This "success" had little to do with schooling and quite a lot to do with those who wished to
"civilize" and "educate" the "Indianness" out of the Indians. In 1885, the federal superintendent
of Indian schools, referred to his task of making the Indian "a member of the new social order,"
and envisioned it thus; "To do this we must recreate him, make him a new personality.
Therefore remove the child from the demoralizing influence of their families to the boarding
school, the more distant the better."32 Thus they were taken from their grieving parents and kept
up to eight years, punished for speaking their own language, and brainwashed of all traces of
Indianness.. . Most returned suspended in vacancy, separate from both cultures."33
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COHEN, supra note 21, at 140, quoting the COMM'RIND. AFF.ANN. REP., H.R. EXEC. DOC. N O . 1,51" Cong. 2d
Sess. V1 ( I 890)
'"EBO,
supra note 29, at 287

" Id. at 288

Cloaked in the pretext of education, the federal boarding schools advanced a policy of

A

cultural displacement intended to erase the traditions and beliefs of Indian children and replace
them with such concepts as citizenship, democracy and manifest destiny. Thomas L. McKemey,
of the Office of Indian Affairs saw these "educated Indians .. . as a strategic intermediate link
between our own citizens, and our wandering neighbors."34 Intended to erode and "civilize" the
Indian population from within, the federal school system continued to grow. An efficiency
argument was made suggesting that "it was less expensive to educate Indians than to kill
them."35 Either way the same result would be obtained.
The first superintendent of the Carlisle Indian Boarding School in Pennsylvania, Captain
Richard Henry Pratt was not reluctant to explain his ideas on Indian education. "A great general
had said that the only good Indian is a dead one. .. I agree with the sentiment, but only in this:
that all the Indian that there is in race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save the
r?

man."36 Attendance was made mandatory by the Appropriations Act of July 13, 1892.~' Failure
on the part of Indian families to send their children to govemment schools was met by legislation
that "for a period of time permitted the withholding of treaty-based govemment rations."38
As this policy of assimilation through education continued, more and more Indian children
were taken from their families and sent to schools that were intentionally far enough away so that
contact with family and tribe was made nearly impossible. While at school the Indian children
were forced to use English as their primary language, their hair and clothing was non-traditional
and any communal concepts that they had were replaced with new ideas such as a respect for

" COHEN, supra note 21, at 122, quoting OFFICE IND. AFF. ANN. REP., S. DOC. NO. 1. 19" Cong. 2d Sess. 508
(1826)
" David

Wallace Adams, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION, 19-20 (1995)
Richard Henry Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians wilh Whiles, cited in FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, 260-61 (1973)
37
Ch. 164 5 l , 2 7 Stat. 120, 143 (superceded by 25 U.S.C. 5282)
38
Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, §1,27 Stat. 612, 628 (codified at 25 U.S.C. $283)
36
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private property and manual labor for personal benefit. Captain Henry Pratt testified before
Congress that the United States "needed to immerse the Indians in waters of our civilization and
when we get them under water, hold them there until they are thoroughly soaked.. . [and thus]
eradicate the Indian but make the man."39 Those with anti-Indian sentiments were not the only
ones in favor of the boarding school system. Members of the Indian Reform Movement also
thought that Indian children would be made into good American citizens who could happily live
in white society. Unfortunately the products of the boarding school system were sent into a
white world that did not want them or back to a reservation to which they were now foreign.40
The tribes were aware of what was happening to their future generations and tried to do what
they could to affect the situation. As a result of their dissatisfaction with the federal schools the
Iroquois and the Cherokee Nation began developing programs that recognized their own cultural
needs, including bilingual education. Sitting Bull, in answer to a request for children to be sent
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to Carlisle said, "I have seen the results of school. The children who return are neither white nor
Indian. Nothing is done for them. I love my children too much to let anything like that happen
to them.'*'
When it became apparent to Captain Henry Pratt and his fellow assimilationists that the
educational assimilation program was not entirely successful, or at least not as quickly as they
would have hoped, they took their campaign to a higher level. In addition to attendance in the
boarding school system, Indian children were to be placed in selected white homes as a means of
ensuring the complete destruction of any remaining cohesiveness with their Indian families.

J. HUFF,TO LIVE HEROICALLY, 3 (1977)
PETER FARB, M A N S RISE TO CIVILIZATION, 257-59 (1968)
Jefkey Hamley, FEDERAL OFF-RESERVATION BOARDING SCHOOLS FOR INDIANS, 47 (Oct. 1986)
cited by Lone M. Graham The Past Never Vanishes: a contextual critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine,
23 A m Indian L. Rev. 1,54, note 66
39 cited by DELORES
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Captain Pratt's ultimate dream was to use this "outing system" to "scatter the entire population
of Indian children across the nation, with some 70,000 families each taking one Indian child."42
"While this dream was not realized during his lifetime, this system of placing American Indian
children with white families served as a precursor to the twentieth century massive displacement
of American Indian children to non-Indian adoptive homes, foster care and

institution^.'^^

C. Shifting Policies of the Twentieth Century

1. The Collier E r a

For most of the next half-century the pendulum of federal Indian policy began to swing back
from the policies of assimilation and allotments." The Snyder Act provided appropriations for
"the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United ~tates."~'The Meriam
A.

Report of 1 9 2 8 still
~ ~ relied somewhat on the policies of assimilation and absorption but also
brought public attention to poverty, disease and other deplorable living conditions of Indians. "It
defined the goal of Indian policy to be the development of all that is good in Indian culture rather
than to crush out all that is ~ndian."~'

42
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Adams, supra note 35, at 14
Graham, supra note 41, at 12
44
see also The General Allotment, or Dawes Act of 1887, codified as 25 U.S.C. $$331-334 et seq. Authorized the
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by President Roosevelt in 1906 as "a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass." See COHEN, supra
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John Collier was appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933. He called for the
preservation of Indian heritage and the revival of tribalism and pushed for the passage of the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934.~'He stated that it would "give [the Indian] a chance
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.'d9 The IRA was
intended to provide a mechanism for the tribe as a governmental unit to interact with and adapt
to a modem society, rather than to force the assimilation of individual Indians." Tribes were
encouraged to organize and act similarly to business corporations and not only was the alienation
of lands blocked but efforts were made to acquire additional lands as needed for economic
development.
While the IRA seemed to express genuine concern for the tribes' well being, a change from
previous legislation, it was similar to much federal Indian legislation in that it was created
without much input from the tribes who were the intended beneficiaries. The IRA encapsulated

,-.

what the federal government thought was best for the Indian tribes. It encouraged the passage of
written constitutions, the election and installation of tribal councils and the creation of tribal
courts, all modeled after the white system of government. While it might be said that this was in
fulfillment of the U.S. government's trust responsibility to the tribes it is more likely another
example of legislation passed under the paternalistic regime of federal Indian policy without
consideration of the tribes' actual needs or preferences.
The economic development and expansion that resulted from the IRA soon made it clear that
the limited resources of the reservations could only effectively support a fraction of the members
who lived on it. With the onset of World War I1 the United States' economy took off and many
Indians were able to benefit from jobs that came available in the defense industry as well as

,-

'a Ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.§461 et seq.)
49
H.R.Rep. No. 1804, 73dCong.. 2d Sess. (1934)
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service in the armed forces. After the war many Indian veterans returned to federal budget cuts
for Indian spending, increased support for the authority of local (state) governments, economic
development that now required the liquidation of tribal property and the resignation of John
Collier from the BIA.
2. Assimilation Revisited

Even though John Collier's successors tried to ensure the preservation of his policies they
were met with continued resistance from Congress as well as the American people
Assimilationist attitudes were revived under the auspices of removing "the restrictions" on
Indian property and setting the Indian people free from their tribal cultures so that they could
more easily become a part of mainstream c ~ l t u r e . ~The
' old attitudes were back just packaged
and presented in a new look.
As a cost cutting measure and to enable the federal government to more efficiently

n

"discharge its responsibility to the tribesflS2four criteria were identified that would help Congress
determine which tribes' funds could either be eliminated or reduced: "1 .) degree of assimilation;
2.) economic conditions and available resources; 3.) willingness of the tribe to dispense with

federal services; 4.) willingness and ability of the states to provide public

service^."^'

These

criteria would help identify the degree of a particular tribe's assimilation and whether the tribe
was ready to complete the assimilation process.
There were different beliefs as to which means of implementation would be the most
effective way to ensure total assimilation of the Indian tribes. In 1949 the Commissioner of an
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, known as the Hoover Commission
COHEN supra note 21, at 147
O.K. Armstrong, Set Ike American Indians Free, Reader's Digest, August 1945, at 47, see also SZASZ, Education
and the Indian, at 112 note 57
52
WilliamZimmerman Jr., SEC.INT.ANN.REP.,349 (1947)
51
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issued a report supporting the termination of the federal responsibility for ~ n d i a n s .The
~ ~ report
proposed a different and more gradual assimilation that included transferring responsibility to the
states, development of Indian self-sufficiency and participation in the economic, social and
political life of the states.55 Those who were in favor of repealing the IRA in the interests of a
more rapid assimilation criticized the Hoover Report's conclusions and proposed legislation that
cut health and social welfare programs and put more authority into the hands of state legislatures
and courts. The National Council of Churches campaigned for the removal of the "degrading"
trust status of the Indian lands and for the "release [of] the Indian from his wardship" to the
federal
Any disputes as to which method of termination would be the most effective were settled
when Dillon S. Myer became Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1950. Myers was the former
director of the Japanese internment camps established after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941.
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He brought the same vigorous and coercive methods of removal and control to the Bureau as he
had used against the Japanese. He called the process that he planned on using "withdrawal
programming." Under Myer the two main goals of the BIA were to achieve a "standard of living
for Indians comparable with that enjoyed by other segments of the population (based upon nonIndian values and concepts) and the step-by-step transfer of Bureau functions to the Indians
themselves or to appropriate agencies of the local, state, or Federal ~overnments."~'Though
Myer's reign in the Bureau was short-lived a House Concurrent Resolution adopted after his
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departure demonstrated that his desires for complete and rapid assimilation would survive him.
-\

Even though, HCR 108, had no actual standing as law it expressed the intent of Congress "to
make the Indians

... subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and

responsibilities as ... other citizens ... and to end their status as wards of the United ~tates."~'
The only way that this intention could actually be achieved would be through termination of the
tribes themselves.
The continuing policy of rapid and coercive assimilation through termination opened the
door for increased conflict between the tribes and states over Indian child welfare issues. The
caseworkers and administrators of the state agencies had no relevant tools for evaluating the
cultural values and societal norms of Indian communities. The decisions the were made and the
procedures that were put in placed were based on values and standards from white society. The
n

cultural misunderstandings that inevitably arose from this lack of knowledge would contribute
significantly to the Indian child welfare crisis of the 1970's.~"

3. Self Determination and Family Traditions
1958 marked yet another swing of the pendulum of federal Indian policy. Growing public
concern and interest in civil rights around the country carried over into legislation affecting the
tribes. While no major policy statements were made multiple pieces of legislation over the next
ten years indicated that the termination era was coming to a close. Public Law 280, which gave
certain states the authority to assert their jurisdiction onto Indian reservations, was amended to
require tribal consent before jurisdiction was granted to the state.60 When Secretary of Interior
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Stewart Udall, of the recently elected Kennedy administration was asked about HCR 1 0 8 ~he
'
said that it had died with the 83rd

Other programs that were introduced included the

1962 Employee Assistance Program, the new Division of Economic Development branch at the

BIA, and the BIA Housing Improvement Program of 1965.~'
Representatives of over sixty-seven tribes, sensing that the threat of termination might be
waning gathered in Chicago in 1961 and adopted a "Declaration of Indian ~ u r p o s e "It~began
~
with a statement of belief "in the inherent right of all people to retain spiritual and cultural
values. The free exercise of these values is necessary to the development of any people."65 The
Declaration continued stating that the Indians wanted the right to participate in the development
of their own programs and solutions." This involvement was something that had been missing
from federal Indian legislation since the end of treaty making in 1871.

In 1967 President Johnson appointed Robert Bennett, the first Indian in almost a century, as
/-'

Commissioner of Indian Affairs. In March of 1968 Johnson delivered a "Special Message to the
Congress on the Problems of the American Indian: 'The Forgotten ~merican."'~'He proposed
"a new goal for our Indian programs. A goal that ends the old debate about termination of Indian
programs and stresses self-determination; a goal that erases old attitudes of paternalism and
promotes partnership and self-help.. . An opportunity to remain on their homelands, if they
choose, without surrendering their dignity; an opportunity to move to towns and cities of
America, if they choose, equipped with the skills to live in equality and dignity."68 That year the
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Ninetieth Congress approved the largest budget in history for aid to Indians along with the Indian
Civil Rights Act.
Even though the formal termination of tribes was ending, Indian children were still being
removed from their homes by the thousands each year. The federal legislation and policy
statements could not change the attitudes and biases of those who still believed that it was in the
best interests of Indian children for them to be raised in a non-Indian environment. Under
religious pretexts or as a result of social welfare programs many Indian children were being
taken from their homes under the assumption that they could be better cared for elsewhere. The
Child Welfare League of America established the Indian Adoption Project in 1959. In the first
year of its existence the project coordinated the adoption of almost four hundred lndian children
by exclusively non-hdian families.69 Religious groups also continued their fervent efforts to
effect conversions by any means necessary. The Latter Day Saints Placement Program removed

A

as many as two thousand Hopi and Navajo children per year from their homes permanently
placing them in Mormon homes throughout the country.70 The ability of the tribes to control this
mass removal of their children was further hindered by deceptive tactics used to "formalize" the
adoptions. "[A] clerk came to me about a family who were being talked to by Mormons about
their children. They gave the parents a piece of paper and said it was just to let them go to
school. But the paper was an adoption form. The clerk and I told the parents what adoption was,
and they said they didn't want thatn7'

69

Bruce Davis, Implementing the Indian Child WelfareAct, 16 Clearinghouse Rev. 179, 181 (1982)
m R. Weyler, Blood of the Land, the Government and Corporate War Against the American Indian Movement, 149
9982)
Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian
,n, Children, 66 U.DET.L.REV.
451 (1989)

/'-\

Not everyone who played a part in the removal of Indian children from their homes did so
with malicious intent. A disproportionately limited number of Indian foster homes were
available for the many Indian children who are in the foster care system. Much of this was due
to the fact that the guidelines used to determine eligibility were based on non-Indian standards as
to what a stable family environment should be and these often precluded placement in an Indian
home. Many of the judges and social workers handling placement decisions regarding Indian
children were ignorant of extended family dynamics that often exist in Indian homes.
While the child-rearing techniques of Indian tribes vary greatly, for many tribes the concept
of "family" is much more expansive than the typical Anglo-American concept. According to
Vine DeLoria, Jr. "it is a multi-generational complex of people and clan and kinship
responsibilities that extends to past and future generations. Kinship and clan were built upon the

,-- idea that individuals owed each other certain kinds of behaviors and that if each individual
performed his or her task properly, society as a whole would function."'* In addition to
biological relationships there exists clan or band relationships. The duty to love and nourish a
child (culturally, emotionally, spiritually, and physically) falls on the community as well as on
the biological family. Therefore it would not be uncommon for a child to be raised by a
grandparent or an Aunt or Uncle or even someone who would not be seen as a family member by
someone unfamiliar with tribal custom. This unfamiliarity has often led to the removal and
placement of Indian children based on a conclusion that they had been neglected or abandoned
when in actuality they were being cared for by a competent and caring member of the child's
"Indian family."
4. Development of the Act

"VINE DELORIA, INDIAN EDUCATION IN AMERICA, 22 (1991) cited in Graham, supra note 41, at 5, note 19
22

In 1969 and again in 1974 surveys conducted by the Association of American Indian Affairs

P

produced some results that got Congress' attenti~n.~'The data showed that in 1969
approximately eighty-five percent of Indian children in the foster care system were in non-hdian
homes.74 Removal was most frequently based on findings of "neglect" or "social deprivation."75
In Minnesota where Indians comprised seven percent of the state population, the risk of being
placed in foster care or in an adoptive setting was five times greater than for non-Indians. In
Montana the risk was thirteen times greater for Indian children. In South Dakota where only
seven percent of the juvenile population was Indian they accounted for forty percent of all
adoptions filed by the State Department of Public Welfare for a ten-year span. In Washington
Indian children stood a ten times greater risk of being adopted into non-Indian homes and in
Wisconsin the risk faced by an Indian child that they would be separated from their parents was
approximately sixteen-hundred percent greater than for non-Indian chi~dren.'~
C

An additional survey done in 1974 indicated that on a national scale twenty-five to thirty-five
percent of all Indian children were separated from their families and placed in foster homes,
adoptive homes or

institution^.^'

To help put this figure into perspective, using data from the

2,000 census, at thirty percent rate of removal, it would be equivalent to another government
coming to the United States and permanently removing twenty-four million American children
under the age of eighteen from their homes.'* These American children would be taken far from
their homes to another country. Once there they would be punished for speaking English, they
would not be able to retain any of their religious or cultural beliefs and they would be forced to
73 ~eprintedas
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act, look and live like the other people in their new country. In very few instances would these
children ever be allowed to return to their families again. This removal would be supported, as
being in the best interests of the children under the claim that they would be better off in their
new environment.
The statistics gathered in the 1969 and 1974 surveys provided the impetus for Congress to
investigate who should make the decision as to what is in the best interests of a child. Congress
began to examine the data that had been collected and heard the testimony that ultimately
resulted in the creation of the ICWA in 1978. Some of the testimony included such statements as
the one from Chief Calvin Isaac of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. He said "Indian
children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by non-tribal government
authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises

n

underlying Indian home life and child rearing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate of
our children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptuous of the Indian
way and convinced that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or institution can only
benefit an Indian ~hild."'~
Congress quickly realized that many agencies were operating on the premise that most Indian
children would really be better off growing up non-Indian. This attitude continued to exist even
though federal Indian policies were recognizing tribal sovereignty and self-determination. The
ICWA was established to guide the actions of courts and agencies away from their traditional
methods of removal. The language that Congress used in the Act deliberately directed when it
would apply, to whom it would apply and how its provisions were to be applied.
5. The Act

The severity of the crisis that faced the Indian tribes was acknowledged by Congress and is

r-',

reflected in the structure of the Act. The history that predated the Act, the specific intent behind
the Act and the authority Congress used to create the Act are all included in the first two sections
of the ICWA. The Act begins with recognition of "the special relationship between the United
States and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people."80
This affirmation of "a special relationship" is an acknowledgement of Indian tribal sovereignty
and the unique status that Indians possess. This acknowledgement makes the Act more than just
another legislative enactment. The fact that the ICWA was created for the benefit of the Indian
tribes places it on a higher level and subject to different standards of interpretation than other
regulations.
The sources of congressional authority are listed in section 1901 under the heading
"Congressional findings."81 They begin with yet another reference to the special relationship
/'.

between the United States and the tribes: "that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States
Constitution provides that 'The Congress shall have Power to regulate Commerce with Indian
tribes' and, through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over
Indian affairs.""

This authority is then applied to a duty "that Congress, through statutes,

treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for
the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources."''
To ensure that there would be no question as to Congress' authority to enact legislation
regarding the adoption process (traditionally a state regulated activity) the legislative history
cites to several cases for support. The cases range from the distant past, Gibbons v. Ogden
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25 U.S.C. $1901

'' Id.
Id. at (1)
''Id. at (2)
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(1824); to the recent past, Hill v. FLA ex rel. Watson (1945); to contemporary, Perez v. Campbell
(1971). All of the cases support the rule that "when Congress legislates pursuant to its delegated

powers, conflicting State law and policy must yield." The legislative history of the ICWA also
presents several references to the "undisputed fact that Congress has plenary authority to
legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters."84
The case that best captures the congressional intent as embodied in the legislative history is

Wakefield v. Little ~ i ~ h t . The
" holding in that case confirmed that "there can be no greater
threat to 'essential tribal relations' and no greater infringement on the right of the.. . tribe to
govern themselves than to interfere with tribal control over the custody of their chi~dren."'~
When this holding is read in consideration of the years of federal Indian policies of assimilation
and termination the real impact and need for the ICWA can be understood. The Act was clearly
,--

created to give the tribes a voice in the growing number of placements of Indian children.
The parties who are to be the beneficiaries of the Act are included in parts 3-5 of $1901.
They are the Indian tribes, Indian families, and Indian children. It is made clear that the United
States was making known its direct interest in protecting Indian children and Indian cultures
through this federal enactment. In the legislative history it was stated that "the wholesale
separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect
of Indian life today.""

It is interesting to note that the only reference to the states is in reference

to their "failure to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families."88
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The congressional declaration of policy in the section 1902 is an assimilation of the findings
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and legislative history into a simple, straightforward objective "to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families."89 This
objective was to be met through the application of the standards and policies within the
remainder of the Act. Much of the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the ICWA
provisions result t?om failure to understand and accept this policy before moving to the other
provisions of the Act. Without oversimplifying the entirety of the provisions in ICWA the
primary regulations follow the declaration of policy. Located in the first three paragraphs of
Subchapter I (Child Custody Proceedings) under section 1911, congress made it clear that
decisions made regarding the placement of Indian children are not to be made without some
opportunity for tribal input or control. By having this section precede the placement preferences
A

congress indicated that the ICWA's primary purpose was to direct who and where decisions
about Indian children should be made (by the tribes in tribal courts). It is only then that
regulations regarding how the decisions were to be made are presented. In hrtherance of their
stated policy "to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families" exclusive
jurisdiction "as to any State over the child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who
resides or is domiciled with the re~ervation,"~'was given to the Indian tribes. This authority also
includes situations where a child is a ward of the court regardless of the residence or domicile of
the child.
When proceedings involve Indian children not domiciled or residing within a reservation,
ICWA mandates that the State court shall transfer the jurisdiction to the Indian child's tribe.9'
This transfer can be blocked by objection by either parent, declination by the tribal court or by a
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finding by the state court of good cause to the ~ontrary.9~
Through this provision congress
makes it clear'that the tribes are best prepared to make decisions as to the best interests of their
own children. They also affirm that in certain situations these best interests can still be advanced
within the original jurisdiction receiving the case. In the event that a state court should retain
jurisdiction of a case, the ICWA authorizes intervention by the tribe, as a matter of right, at any
point in the proceeding.93 While the time allowed for this intervention might be seen as overly
generous it is justified by the long history of deception faced by the Indian tribes in the attempted
removal of their children.
A final section, which if applied properly, would make intervention and the transfer of
jurisdiction unnecessary is titled "Social and cultural standards applicable" and is located under
section 1915 "Placement of Indian children."94 Section 1915 provides guidelines to be used by a
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state court that finds itself handling either the adoption or placement of an Indian chi~d.~'The
guidelines for adoptions give preference "absent good cause to the contrary"96 to "a member of
the child's extended family, other members of the Indian child's tribe or other Indian fa mi lie^."^'
The preferences may be avoided with a finding of "good cause to the contrary." This good cause
must still be in accordance with the provision at §1915(d). This provision simultaneously
provides the solution to the problem facing Indian child placement while also providing the
opportunity for total disregard of what ICWA stands for. It provides that "the standards to be
applied in meeting the preferences requirements of this section shall be the prevailing social and
cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent or extended family resides or
id. at @)
Id.
93 Id. at 191 1(c)
%Id. at 1915(d)
95
Id. similar provisions for temporary and foster care placement follow in the next section
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91
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which the parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties."98 This
requirement asks the state courts to do just what §1901(5) finds them guilty of not doing. The
courts are supposed to understand and apply standards and values that they have historically
ignored and held in contempt. While the ICWA clearly states its policy and procedures it is
vulnerable to attack fiom those whose prejudices and racist attitudes are precisely what the Act is
supposed to remedy. Once the Act became law these attacks came quickly through the courts
and through legislative attempts to restrict the Act's application.

111.

RESPONSES TO THE ACT

Almost immediately after the creation of the ICWA adoption advocates, state legislatures and
state courts began to react. Some states had no problem incorporating the Act's provisions into
their adoption and child custody regulations. Others set out to find loopholes that would permit
A

them to avoid having to apply the Act and its subsequent recognition of tribal sovereignty.

A. The Existing Indian Family Exception
In Kansas a case involving the voluntary placement of an Indian child by his non-Indian
mother resulted in the birth of the judicially created existing Indian family exception (EIF).~"
When applied by the courts this exception enables them to not have to use the ICWA standards.
The EIF continues to be the bane of ICWA's existence even to this day.
In the clear language of the ICWA there are two requirements that mandate the invocation of
the Act. The child must be an Indian as defined at §1903(4) and the action must be a child
custody proceeding as described at §1903(1). In fact the ICWA legislative history supports
(-'
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decisions not to include an existing Indian family requirement. Congress rejected an earlier
version of the Act that would have required, as a prerequisite for tribal court jurisdiction that an
Indian child not living on a reservation have "significant contacts" with a tribe.'"

Nevertheless,

the EIF implies a third requirement that has no foundation in the Act whatsoever. In deciding
whether or not to apply the ICWA standards the court may look to see if the child in question has
lived or is connected to a sufficiently Indian family. The Kansas Supreme Court in re Baby Boy

L upheld a lower court's decision that the application of ICWA to a case involving the adoption
consent given by a non-Indian mother over the objections of a non-custodial father who
happened to be incarcerated at the time of the adoption.'0' The child was an enrolled member of
the Kiowa tribe yet the court denied the tribe's requests for intervention. The Kansas court
looked first to see if the child had developed a bond with the Indian parent. Then the court

r'

looked to see whether the child had suficient ties to the tribal culture or reservation.lo2 The
irony of the EIF is that once the courts begin making inquiries into the degree of tribal
connection had by the parties they are doing that which the Act was created to prevent. The Act
specifically faults the states for failing "to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people
and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families."lo3

. Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme Court was the first court after the Kansas Supreme Court
to address the exception. Though the Arizona Court distinguished the holding in Baby Boy L.,
the application of ICWA was denied to a putative Indian father who had not acknowledged his
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paternity. Looking to the definition of parent in the Act the court held that the child was not
actually Indian by definition and thus refused to apply the ICWA provisions.1°4
Two years later the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on the Arizona holding and the rationale
from Kansas in deciding two Indian child custody cases. In the first case the application of the
Act was denied for an Indian child who had lived exclusively with his non-Indian mother and
thus had never resided in an Indian family.'05 The second case denied a non-custodial Indian
father an opportunity to invoke the Act's provisions based on his failure to financially support
his daughter.'06 he court found that she had not been a part of an Indian family for those six
years and thus would not allow ICWA application.'07
While several other jurisdictions also adopted the EIF Indiana was the next jurisdiction to
further expand its application. The Indiana Supreme Court applied the EIF to an Indian mother

,-

who had voluntarily given up her child for adoption when it was five days old.108The Indiana
court focussed on the bond between the Indian parent and the child holding that five days was
insufficient time to be able to say that the child was coming from an existing Indian family and
refused to allow ICWA to apply. This standard pretty much gave the court the ability to apply
the EIF at will because it created a nearly impossible standard for any non-custodial parent to
meet.
The next evolutionary steps for the exception took place in Alabama in 1990 and in
Washington in 1992. These courts moved fkom an inquiry into the parent-child relationships to
the cultural ties between the Indian parents and the tribal culture or reservation. This expansion
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again was without support kom the provisions of the Act and was contrary to its purposes and
\-,

history. In Alabama an illegitimate child who was living with its Indian father and paternal
grandmother was not deemed as actually living in an Indian family because the father (though
enrolled in the Cherokee Nation) did not live on the reservation and the child did not sufficiently
participate in tribal customs.'09 Meanwhile the Washington Supreme Court denied an Indian
mother's attempt to revoke her consent to adoption because she was not enrolled until after her
consent had already been given."0 In their opinion the child was never a part of an existing
Indian family and thus not protected by the Act. The Washington court did limit this application
to the particular facts in the case.'"

B. The U.S. Supreme Court and Holyfield: ICWA Interpreted
During this period ofjudicial expansion only one case involving the application of the ICWA
/-'

reached the U.S. Supreme ~ o u r t . "Although
~
the Court never specifically mentioned the ELF its
holding has survived as an affirmation and clarification of the initial purpose and history behind
the ICWA. The basic facts ofHolyfield involved twin boys who were eligible for membership in
the Choctaw tribe. Their parents, members of the Choctaw tribe saw to it that the children were
born off of the reservation so that their domicile could be claimed as "off the reservation." The
children were voluntarily given up for adoption and the Mississippi courts refused to apply
ICWA using a definition of domicile from their state law. The Supreme Court set aside the
Mississippi Supreme Court decree finding the "Chancery court ... without jurisdiction to enter

IW

7
'

S.A. v. E.J.P. 571 So.2d 1187(Ala.Civ.App. 1990)
in re Adoption of Crews 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992)
Ia I Id.
111
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (1989)
'I0

-,

an adoption decree.""'

Justice Brennan, writing the 6-3 majority opinion addressed two clear

issues in the case. Both issues revolved around the definition of the term domicile. The first
issue involved a determination of how Congress intended for the state courts to define tenns not
explicitly defined within the Act. The Court held that even though the term domicile was not
statutorily defined it was not the intent of Congress to have the states define it as a matter of state
law.Il4 Adding "it was highly improbable that Congress would have intended to leave the scope
of the statute's key jurisdictional provisions to definition by state

court^.""^

The Court

acknowledged Congress' desire for uniformity in application and definition among the states.
The second issue involved a determination of the domicile of the children in this particular case
and an inquiry into how it should be determined. The Court held that the domicile of the
children should be determined according to rules of general common law and thus followed the
A

domicile of their mother. As none of the parties disputed that both parents were domiciled on the
reservation it was a simple step to then declare the twins domiciled on the reservation as we11."~
Based upon this declaration the tribal courts would have exclusive jurisdiction in the adoption
pursuant to $191 l(a) of the Act.
While the core issues of the Holyfield decision were rather straightforward the explanation by
the Court of its thought processes provided some insight into other applications of the Act. The
court held that absent statutory definition it is generally assumed that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used, in light of the statute's object and
policy.""7 The Court found a clearly expressed intent for a uniform federal law of domicile for
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the ICWA. The Court had articulated one of the primary criticisms of the EIF without ever
mentioning the exception by name. The plain language of the Act creates two threshold
questions used to determine whether the Act should be applied. First, is the child in question an
Indian child and second is this a child custody proceeding? At this point there is no need nor is
there justification for the courts to create another exception that was not originally intended by
Congress.
In the instructions that accompanied the Court's remand of the Holyfield case to the tribal
courts, Justice Brennan explained "the Supreme Court must defer to the expertise, wisdom, and
compassion of the tribal court to fashion an appropriate remedy.""8 This comment was directed
at those who raised questions about the timeliness and potential harm to the children that might
result from remanding the decision now that the twins had been allowed to bond with their
adoptive family for several years. The court also emphasized "that the tribe has an interest in the
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child which is distinct from but on a parity with the interests of the parents.. . Indian children
have a corresponding interest in maintaining a relationship with the tribe, even if the parents do
not share that intere~t.""~

C. Post-HolyJield Reactions

1. Judicial Responses

The reactions of the states to the Holyfield decision varied. Some states that had previously
applied the EIF exception looked at Holyfield as a signal that it was time to change their
philosophy. Many looked to the plain meaning of the statute rather than continuing to apply
their judicially created exceptions. One of the states who explicitly cited Holyfield while
r'.
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lawyer) concealed their Indian heritage from the non-Indian adoptive parents. After the
voluntary proceeding for adoption had commenced the court blocked the parents' desire to
invalidate the adoption by raising the provisions in ICWA. The court took a major step in its
attack of the ICWA claiming that absent "significant connections" with a tribe, application of the
Act violated the rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Tenth ~mendments.'~'This constitutional
attack was affirmed and cited in the holding of a subsequent case, I n re Alexandria y.I2'
Meanwhile the First, Third, and Fifth appellate districts have continued their belief that
"judicially.created exceptions to the Indian Child Welfare Act should not be permitted."129
Ultimately, this jurisdictional split among the California courts was reconciled by the California
legislature. Assembly Bill 65, an urgency measure effective September 1999 "directed the
courts to strive to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families and to comply
with ICWA in all Indian child custody proceedings, as specified." It also requires that "the Act
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be applied if the tribe determines that an unmarried person, who is under the age of eighteen
years, is a member of the tribe or is eligible for membership and is a biological child of a
member of a tribe. Such determination shall constitute a significant political affiliation with the
tribe and shall require the application of the federal Indian Child Welfare ~ct.""' One cannot
help but recognize the language of this measure as coming directly from the Act itself. In a
sense the California legislature required its courts to do what ICWA had previously attempted.
In 1982 Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act (OICWA) with the
express purpose of clarifying state policies and procedures as they applied to the implementation
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of the federal ICWA.'~' The OICWA was almost identical to its federal counterpart except that
it included a provision requiring application of the ICWA provisions in the event that a divorce
resulted in an Indian child being placed with a third party.'32 The OICWA was later amended to
prevent the use of the EIF. As amended the Act applies "regardless of whether or not the
children involved are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at
the time state proceedings are initiated."13'
In the 1983 holding from New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe the Supreme Court
declared that "state jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law [including] the goal of
promoting tribal self-govenunent.'34 The jurisdiction referred to also includes any attempts to
expand or contract the provisions of federal legislation beyond its plain meaning. When the state
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courts apply judicially created exceptions to federal law as they have done with the EIF they
directly interfere with the policy interests stated at the beginning of the Act. Nevertheless they
continue to do so.
The courts that raised constitutional challenges in support of their application of the EIF
overlook the fact that the Act is special in that it applies to Indian tribes who have been
recognized as political rather racial ~lassifications'~~
and therefore are not subject to the same
congressional scrutiny. As a political classification the tribes are also entitled to treatment that is
different than the states due to their sovereign status and unique relationship with the United
States. They are "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their

10 O.S. $40.1 et seq.
12 O.S. Ch. 2, App., Rule 8.2
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members and their t e m t ~ r ~ . "It 'is~ an
~ acknowledgement of this sovereignty that the congress
included in the purposes behind the Act. Finally, because of the centuries of federal policies that
were aimed at tribal termination and assimilation "the protection of the integrity of Indian
families is a permissible goal that is rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
guardianship obligation toward the Indian~."'~'
2. Legislative Responses
The states have but two options before them either comply with the provisions of the Act or
seek to have it amended. To abide by the provisions of the Act the state courts would also
acknowledge the essential sovereign powers of the tribes to determine [and control] their own
membership.'38 By applying the plain meaning of the ICWA provisions the states help affect the
goals of the Act and would help slow the removal of Indian children from their homes. The
Sixth District Court of California stated it best,

n

"when statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for
construction and courts should not indulge in it. Congress has clearly defined the
nature of the relationship an Indian child must have with a tribe in order to trigger
application of the Act. There is no threshold requirement in the Act that the child
must have been born into or be living with an existing Indian family, or must have
some particular type of relationship with the tribe or his or her Indian heritage."
139

If the states want to change the provisions of the statute they can use legislation and the support
of public opinion.
Attempts to amend the Act seem to continue as various pieces of legislation have been
moving through both houses of congress since 1987. None of these proposed amendments have
actually been ratified so for the moment the ICWA remains unchanged. There seems to be two
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main camps attempting to amend the ICWA. One group seems to want to restrict the Act's
/--\

application and continues attempts to codify various forms of the existing Indian family
exception. The other group seems to be looking tighten up the application of the Act making it
more efficient to apply and more difficult to avoid.
Senate Bill 1976 was the first attempt at amending ICWA. It was introduced in the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1987. The provision sought to limit delays by clarifying
some of the ambiguities of application as well as strengthening tribal rights by guaranteeing
application of the Act regardless of whether the child was a member of an existing Indian
family.I4' The amendment strongly favored tribal interests over individual rights. It included
changes to the ICWA policy statement, application of placement preferences and the definition
of Indian child.14' State courts would have less freedom to refuse to transfer a case and would be
required to provide notice to tribes in more situations. Ironically the amendment, intended to
A

prevent the continued removal of Indian children was labeled "pure racism"'42 by the Reagan
administration. Even though problems were acknowledged with the Act the bill never made it
out of committee. Several years passed before another attempt to amend ICWA was made.

In 1995 Representative Deborah Pryce of Ohio introduced House Bill 1448 which would
have limited the ICWA. An adoptive parent herself, Representative Pryce advanced the interests
of adoptive parents and adoption agencies. Representative Pryce gave emotional testimony
S. 1976, 100' Cong. (1987)
The policy statement would read: The Congress hereby declares its intent io protect the right of Indian children to
develop a tribal identity and to maintain ties to the lndian community within a family where their Indian identity will
be nurtured. Placement preferences could only be avoided where the child, over the age of twelve and of sufficient
maturity requested a different placement; or where through expert testimony, it was established that the child had
extraordinary physical or emotional needs which could not be met through the placement preferences, and where
after a diligent search, families within the la cement references could not be located. The defmition of lndian child
would incide "of ~ndiandescent and is cdnsidered by an Indian tribe to be part of its community.. .; if a child is an
infant he or she is considered to be a part of a tribal community if either parent is so considered. Indian Child
Wevare Acl: Hearing Before rhe Senate Select Committee on Indian Affnirs on S. 1976 to Amend the Indian child
WelfareAct, 100'" Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1988) at 9-10, 24-26
141
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before the House refemng to the lower court ruling in Bridget R.'"

"Yesterday, a judge in

California took [children] away from the only family they have ever known and awarded custody
to a perfect stranger, the birth

Her testimony was premature because a

California Court of Appeals later reversed the decision applying the existing Indian family
exception.14' House Bill 1448 focussed primarily on the definitions of Indian and membership in
a tribe. ICWA would only apply if the Indian child or Indian parent were tribal members at the
initiation of the child custody proceedings.'46 Adoption advocates believed that the bill would
limit what they saw as instability in the placement system and shorten the length of litigation.
Tribal advocates answered this criticism by saying that litigation would be much less lengthy and
placements would be much more stable if the ICWA provisions would be applied from the
beginning of the custody proceedings. The House Sub-committee on Native American and

,-'

Insular Affairs suggested that both factions "work together for a so~ution."'~'
H.B. 1448 did not pass but some of its provisions were incorporated into part of the Adoption
Protection Stability Act of 1996. This act was created without consultation or input from tribal
advocates or any of the House Committees with jurisdiction over Indian affairs. Upon its arrival
in the Senate it was met with opposition and the Clinton administration "intimated no support"
feeling that it could "violate tribes' [rights to] self-governance."'4s The act ultimately passed but
only after the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs struck the section that contained the
references to the E l . , ICWA and tribes. The Committee stated that "the ICWA recognizes that
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the Federal hust responsibility and the role of Indian tribes asparenspatriae extended to all
,
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children involved in all custody proceedings."'49

In July of 1996, Senator John McCain of Arizona introduced Senate Bill 1962. It was
reported as a detailed compromise between tribal representatives and adoption

advocate^.'^^

Amongst other things the bill would require that notice be given to tribes in voluntary placement
proceedings but also limited the length of time available for intervention.15' There were no
provisions regarding the EIF yet criminal penalties were included for attorneys who participated
in the concealment of a child's or parent's Indian ancestry.'52 The Senate approved the bill in
September 1996 but stalled in the House during the final days of the session. Right-to-life
advocates joined the debate claiming that the bill would encourage abortions by those women
who felt a threat to their personal control over their pregnancies. The same bill was reintroduced
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as S. 569 during the next session but it again failed to pass both houses.
Senator McCain has continued his efforts to ensure that any amendments to the ICWA
remain true to its original purpose and involve sufficient input from all of the interested parties.
During the 106'~Congress S. 1213 was introduced and contained the same provisions as S. 569
and 1962. The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs where it died without
comment. Its demise is rather ironic especially since three of its sponsors (Senators McCain,
Dominici, and Campbell) are on that Committee and Sen. Campbell is the chair.
Other legislation affecting adoptions has been enacted it remains to be seen what sort of
impact it will have on the ICWA provisions. In 1998 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
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and Enforcement ~ c t ' (UCCJA)
~'
was created and made available to the states for their use. The
%- ' ,

jurisdiction of the UCCJA is based upon the "child and a contestant living in a 'home state' for
six months."lS4 Another provision, sounding very much like the EIF, provides that a "significant
connection to the jurisdiction might be in the child's best

interest^."'^^

An optional provision

extends the act's application to Indian tribes within the state.Is6 TOdate only four states have
adopted the UCCJA, Oklahoma, Nevada, Wisconsin and North Dakota. Its impact on the
placement of Indian children and potential conflict with ICWA remains to be seen.

IV.

The Future of Indian Child Welfare

The testimony provided by Rep. Pryce before the House of Representatives in 1995 is an
example of the sort of emotional and often inaccurate statements that quite often are made
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regarding legislation designed to help tribes. An article in the Christian Science Monitor titled
'Tribes Dispute Adoption Without Reservation" informed its readers in 1988 that "the
congressional statute [ICWA] requires tribal mothers of children with American Indian blood
who want to place them for adoption to notify tribal courts first. The courts then attempt to find
qualified Indian families to give them homes."15' The article makes no mention of the possibility
that the tribe might decide to place the child outside the standard preferences. Nor does it
mention the situations where jurisdiction could be refused by the tribal court. Instead it sends a
message that the only purpose of the Act is to give tribes absolute control over adoption
proceedings. In an article printed in the Denver Rocky Mountain News Jane Gorman, attorney of
record for the Bridget R. case stated "had the ICWA been clarified from the beginning with
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respect to adoptive placements, then perhaps challenges to Native American adoptions would not
have arisen in the first place. We can only hope that Congress has the foresight to ensure that
Native American children are protected and that these challenges never happen again." The
irony of this statement is that it very closely resembles what the Supreme Court said towards the
end of Holyfield, "had the mandate of the ICWA been followed in 1986, of course much
potential anguish might have been avoided."'58 Many of the objections to ICWA criticize the
potential harm that its application might cause to children who have already been placed in nonIndian homes. This neglects to consider the potential harm that the Indian tribes face if the
removal of their children is allowed to continue.
Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court once said, "ignorance is
one of the greatest barriers to understanding between peoples. If we do not understand each
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other, if we do not know the culture or the history of each other, it is difficult to see the value of
and dignity of each other's so~ieties."'~~
Ignorance of the impact that the removal of Indian
children has on Indian tribes continues to impede the achievement of the goals behind the ICWA.
Much of this ignorance continues from those who maintain their beliefs that removal is in the
best interests of Indian children.
In re Adoption of ~ a ~ o w was
a ~an'adoption
~ ~ case involving a Navajo child heard by the

Utah Supreme Court in 1986. The Utah court applied the provisions of ICWA and granted
exclusive jurisdiction to the Navajo Nation Courts. In their holding they addressed the tribal
interest vis-8-vis parental interests in a child. "The tribe has an interest in the child which is
distinct from but on a parity with the interests of the parents. This relationship between Indian
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tribes and Indian children finds no parallel in other ethnic cultures found in the United states."16'
The court continued, emphasizing the importance of tribal input into the decision process as a
means of protecting its own future. "Few matters are of more central interest to a tribe seeking
to preserve it identity and traditions than the determination of who will have the care and custody
of its chi~dren."'~'
The Utah Supreme Court remanded in re Adoption of HaNoway to the Navajo Nation Courts
to be decided according to their codes and customs. Upon receiving the news of the remand, the
potential adoptive mother expressed her feelings that "I don't think its any good for any of them
to live on the reservation. You've got drug abuse, alcoholism, [and] teen-age suicide down
there." Her attorney added "the Indian culture is foreign to me, and I don't think it's va~id."'~'
These are the beliefs of the people who were to be deciding what was in the best interests of the
Navajo child. This sort of disrespect and ignorance of the culture from which the child was

.?
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being taken goes directly to the very reasons that ICWA was created.
The Policy on Adoption of Children, from the Navajo Nation Code "neither favors nor
disfavors adoption of Navajo children by persons who are not members of the Navajo Nation,
but states as its policy that each case shall be considered individually on its own merits."'64
Taking note of the years that the child had already been with the adoptive family the Navajo
Nation Family Court decided that it would be in the best interest of the child to not make any
changes to the living situation. This sort of result is to be expected when the provisions of

ICWA are applied after the fact. Tribal courts are forced to take into consideration the potential
damage that they might inflict on a child ifthey remove him or her from a temporary home, even
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if it is outside of the ICWA preferences. Those who avoid applying the Act often are rewarded
for their efforts at the tribes' expense.
Misunderstanding as to the impact that is faced by Indian tribes from the many years of
removal of children from their homes is not reserved to courts and prospective parents. Christine
Bakeis wrote an article for the Notre Dame Journal of Legal Ethics and Public Policy in 1996
where she attacked the ICWA provisions as being in violation of individual Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.

She questioned the Act's recognition of the tribes' vital interest in

deciding whether Indian children should be separated from their families.'66 She also questioned
whether protecting the Indian child's relationship to the tribe is really in the child's best
interest.16' Her conclusions come from an individual perspective without any awareness of the
nature of tribal families and culture. She criticized the definitions of ICWA as "so broadly
,P,,

framed that children who do not even know of their Indian ancestry can be subject to the rules of
the ICWA."'~~
These children that she mentions are often the children of Indian parents who
have lost their connection with their Indian ancestry. The definition of Indian child under section
1903(4) of the ICWA includes those who are members of an Indian tribe or are the biological

children of a member of a tribe and eligible for membership.'69 This definition is intended to
close the gap that is created when a generation is removed from its cultural environment. It
provides an opportunity for the child to have what was taken away from its parents. This is not
without limit, the parent must be enrolled and thus it is important that the break in continuity be
mended at the first generation otherwise the connection may be permanently lost. In the North
9NNC5615
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Dakota Law Review in 1997 B.J.Jones wrote that it was "the author's experience over twelve
years that many of the parents who wish to place their children outside of the tribe for
placements, themselves had been reared outside of the tribe and were taught to be ashamed of
their status as I n d i a n ~ . " ' ~ ~
If the same sort of activity as has taken place in this country were to happen in another
country it would be looked at much differently. The systematic removal of Indian children from
their families has been done for many years to cause the eventual assimilation of Indian tribes
into American society. Even when the official policy leaned the other direction the removal
continued. According to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of ~enocidel""forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.. . with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" constitutes
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genocide and is a crime under international law which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to
prevent and to punish.'72 The United States is one of the contracting parties to this provision.
Nevertheless it is much easier to criticize someone else's actions than to look at your own
behaviors. Australia recently apologized to the aborigine people for a campaign of removal that
effected the taking of thousands of aborigine children from their homes.

V.

Conclusion
The Indian Child Welfare Act was created in 1978 for the express purpose of protecting

Indian children and promoting the security and stability of Indian tribes and families.'''

It was

created as an acknowledgement of the years of purposeful removal of Indian children from their
homes without any consent or input from the tribes. The decisions for removal varied from
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attempts at assimilation to racist notions that the children would be better of in a non-Indian
environment. The Act's success depended upon an acceptance by those who would apply its
provisions of its purpose and objectives. The stability and security of Indian tribes cannot be
promoted unless the Federal standards included in the Act and the placements of Indian children
actually "reflect the unique values of Indian culture" as directed by the Act.
Adoption advocates have criticized the complicated provisions and lengthy adjudicatory
processes that result when ICWA is applied. They often neglect to realize that the process would
be much simpler if the ICWA was applied from the outset. The Act is quite simple in its
directions. If the child involved is Indian and if the proceeding is a child custody proceeding as
defined by the Act it applies. Even when it does apply it does not necessarily mean that a tribal
court will prevent an Indian child from being placed into a non-Indian home. The Navajo Nation
Code specifically adopts this policy of looking at each situation on a case by case basis. The
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preferences from the Act are just preferences, not mandates, but to apply the preferences the
provisions must be read in their entirety. The courts and participants involved just need to
become aware that the best interests of an Indian child can be met by placement within his or her
own tribe. The option still exists that a child might be placed outside of the tribal setting if a
sufficient connection to his or her culture can be ensured or if the tribe (the correct party to make
the decision) finds good reason to do so.
If the courts continue to apply judicially created exceptions, ignoring the plain meaning
of the Act they will be continuing the slow process of eroding the tribes' stability from the inside
out. This activity is pre-empted by the Act as a federal statute and is also within the definition of
the crime of genocide according to the United Nations. Fortunately many states have made
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ICWA a part of their adoption statutes and look to its provisions when applicable. A continued
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awareness and acceptance of the tribes' interest in their children's future is necessary if the
tribes' future will be protected. The United States Congress will have the continuing
responsibility of ensuring that any amendments to the ICWA are consistent with its original
findings and purpose.
Geronimo, looking back on his homeland after years of exile expressed it thus: "For each
tribe of men Usen created He also made a home. ... Thus it was in the beginning: the Apaches
and their homes each created for the other by Usen himself. When they are taken from these
homes they sicken and die."'"
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This also applies to children.

